Security products are usually vague about their limits, which is how people end up relying on them for the wrong thing. Here is the whole picture, including the parts that are not flattering.
| Situation | What happens |
|---|---|
| Someone borrows your unlocked phone and starts swiping | Your photos are not in Photos. Sock Drawer is locked, and its icon says nothing about what is inside. |
| Someone asks you to open the app | Your decoy PIN opens a separate, empty vault. It is a different vault with a different key, not a filtered view — the real files cannot be decrypted with it. The app shows no sign the feature exists while the decoy is open. |
| A photo app or backup sweeps up your camera roll | Nothing here is in the camera roll. The built-in camera writes straight into the vault. |
| Something on your phone uploads your photos | These files are encrypted with a key held on this device only, and the app has no networking code to upload them with. |
| Your phone goes in for repair | The vault is encrypted at rest and excluded from backups. A technician browsing the Photos app finds nothing of yours here. |
| Someone screenshots or screen-records your media | It captures black, and the app tells you it happened. |
There is no cloud copy, so there is nothing to restore from. If the phone is lost, stolen or broken and you have not saved a Transfer archive, the photos are gone permanently. This is the most likely way to lose data with this app, by a wide margin. Save an archive.
The decoy defeats a person holding your phone. It does not defeat forensic software: two vaults are visible on disk as two directories, so someone examining the filesystem can tell a second one exists. They cannot read it without the PIN — the key is wrapped — but they can see it is there.
Face ID always opens the real vault, whichever PIN you last typed. That is the price of keeping the one-glance unlock. If that matters for your situation, do not set up Face ID and use the PIN only.
Once you set a PIN, the vault key is kept two ways: wrapped under the PIN, and in the keychain behind Face ID. Resetting or re-enrolling Face ID on the phone deliberately invalidates the second one, and the app then asks for your PIN to put it back. If you have also forgotten the PIN, nothing can open the vault — not us, not Apple. Write the PIN down somewhere safe, and save a Transfer archive.
The screenshot blackout stops the operating system's own capture path. Nothing can stop somebody photographing your screen with another phone.
If the operating system itself is compromised, no app on it can protect you, and one that claimed otherwise would be lying. Sock Drawer protects your photos from other apps and from people, not from a phone that has already been taken over.
Archives are encrypted with a passphrase you choose, and there is no recovery. Not by us, not by anyone. A forgotten passphrase means a permanently unreadable file.
With the passphrase, an archive does not need the app. The format is public and sockdrawer-open reads it on any computer. That also means anyone who has both the file and the passphrase can open it there, outside the app and its PIN.
Two in particular, because they come up and the honest answer is to send you elsewhere.
Crossing a border. Security organisations advise travelling with as little sensitive data on your device as possible, and keeping anything sensitive in end-to-end encrypted storage you access afterwards. A vault on a device you are carrying, which you can be required to unlock, is the situation they are warning about. Sock Drawer does not help here and would make things worse by feeling like it did.
Documenting abuse. Advocates recommend storing evidence somewhere the other person cannot physically reach, precisely because they have access to your device. An on-device vault is the wrong shape for that. Please use a service or a person outside your home.
Plainly, and without adjectives: